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Implications of Brexit for UK ESIF programming and future regional policy. 
Abstract 
The UK referendum on EU membership resulted in a vote to leave the bloc. The UK and EU are 
currently in limbo whilst the withdrawing Member State prepares to trigger Article 50 and 
formally notify its intent to depart. The financial, legal and economic implications are expected to 
be wide-ranging although the process of unpicking the interlinkages across different policy areas 
has not yet begun. In the case of Cohesion Policy, the negotiation of an end date for eligibility and 
the extent to which the established regulatory procedures around N+3 and programme closure 
will be applied to the departing UK will be crucial, not only in determining the exact financial 
‘hit’ to UK regions of Brexit but also in terms of implications for programming on the ground. 
Regulatory specificities mean that the withdrawal process could be characterized by regions who 
voted to leave the EU still spending their EU allocations and required to comply with EU law long 
after UK withdrawal.  
  
On 23rd June 2016 in an in/out referendum on EU membership, the UK electorate voted to leave 
the European Union. The next step is for the UK (Government) to trigger Article 501 and 
commence a two-year countdown period at the end of which the UK would automatically cease to 
be an EU member2. As there is no set timeframe for when the government should begin the process, 
nor set form it should take, the UK Government has been able to delay. Prime Minister Theresa 
May has suggested March 2017 as the date for formal notification of the UK’s intention to 
withdraw from the EU.3  
Brexit is expected to be the “most difficult political transformation”4 that the UK has undergone 
in recent times, with wide-ranging financial, economic and legal implications across a range of 
policy areas. This article seeks to determine the implications of Brexit on ESIF programming and 
regional policy in the UK. It looks at the financial implications, administrative challenges and legal 
                                                          
1
 Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
2 Unless either a withdrawal agreement sets a different date, or there is a unanimous decision of the 28 Member States 
to extend that time limit. 
3
 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37532364 
4
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-article-50-parliament-vote-needed-dominic-grieve-eu-
referendum-uk-a7141596.html 
ambiguities before offering some preliminary observations around regional funding and spatial 
policy under alternative UK-EU relationships. 
 
Financial implications of the withdrawal of ESIF 
The end of EU Cohesion Policy is likely to have minimal effect financially on the UK as a whole: 
the amount received is small in relation to GDP - less than 0.1%.5  However, EU receipts vary 
considerably across the UK and the financial implications of their cessation would be territorially 
diverse. Of the 37 regions of the UK (as classified by the EU NUTS system), 35 are net 
contributors, with only West Wales and the Valleys and Cornwall being net beneficiaries.6 The 
Welsh Government expects to receive more than 3 billion euros over the 2014-2020 programming 
period under across the 4 ESI funds, whilst Cornwall has been allocated more than 600 million 
euros. Unsurprisingly, it is these two ‘less-developed’ regions that have been the most vocal since 
the referendum in calling for EU funding to be guaranteed or substituted in the event of Brexit. 
This in spite of the majority of the electorate of both having voted to leave – Cornwall by 56% in 
favour and Wales by 52%.  
The biggest vulnerability in relation to ESIF financial allocations and their potential loss to the UK 
is, of course, the timing and content of Article 50 withdrawal negotiations. The current 2014-2020 
programmes have established EU and national budget allocations up until 2020. With the 
triggering of Article 50 expected in early 2017 and a two-year withdrawal process provided for in 
the Treaties, it is reasonable to assume that the programming period will be shortened in the UK; 
an end to EU budgetary contributions is likely to coincide with the withdrawal of ESIF allocations 
to the UK. On current forecasts, the less-developed regions of the UK could forfeit, as a result, up 
to two years (2019 and 2020) of their ESI funding allocations, equating to more than 860m and 
170m euros respectively in Wales and Cornwall. Whilst insignificant in relation to GDP figures, 
the sums received by the more impoverished areas look more substantial when compared to other 
forms of UK regional or regeneration funding. Future funding opportunities will also be missed 
                                                          
5https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/355455/BIS_14_981__Review_of_t
he_Balance_of_Competences_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf  
6Open Europe (2012) Off Target, The Case for Bringing Regional Policy Back Home, 
http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/2012EUstructuralfunds.pdf  
out on. The performance reserve7 is due to be considered and awarded in 2019 but unlikely to be 
allocated to regions external to the EU. Potential funding from post-2020 programming periods 
will be lost, alongside access to the Connecting Europe Facility, the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments. The impact on financing from bodies such as the European Investment Bank has yet 
to be determined. 
Immediately following the referendum, a number of Managing Authorities in the UK ‘paused’ 
issuing new funding agreements.8 Recent announcements by Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) have 
attempted to provide reassurance, initially by indicating that all ESIF projects contracted prior to 
the Autumn Statement would be guaranteed funding, even when those projects continue beyond 
the UK’s departure from the EU. The guarantee was then extended further to incorporate all ESIF 
projects signed before the UK leaves the EU.9 The level and timing of commitments to projects is 
increasingly vital therefore in ensuring UK regions benefit as fully as possible. The 2014-2020 
programmes were generally late to start (e.g. the England ESF programme was officially launched 
in January 2016), and commitment levels are low in a number of programmes. The guarantee to 
substitute domestic funds for projects signed before the UK’s formal exit could lead to a deliberate 
acceleration of programming which would need to be balanced against ensuring due diligence. 
 
ESIF Programming Implications of Brexit 
The conclusion of a withdrawal agreement between the UK and EU within a 2-year period is 
complicated by the regulatory specificities of Cohesion policy. ESI funding is allocated in annual 
tranches, with expenditure and the submission of a payment application to the European 
Commission required by the end of the third financial year following the year of budget 
commitment (N+3). Therefore, whilst allocations could cease promptly once the withdrawal 
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 The performance reserve is a financial allocation awarded in relation to programme performance and attainment of 
Union objectives. A review of performance of the programmes is to be undertaken in 2019 in cooperation with the 
Member States. 
8http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/european-regional-development-fund-erdf-suspends-treasury-
brexit-eu-referendum-a7154526.html 
9https://www.gov.uk/government/news/further-certainty-on-eu-funding-for-hundreds-of-british-projects; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-philip-hammond-guarantees-eu-funding-beyond-date-uk-leaves-
the-eu 
process is complete, rules regarding eligibility of expenditure will make closure of the policy and 
programmes far more problematic. Under the current regulatory framework, ESIF expenditure 
could continue in the regions and be reimbursed from the European Commission for three years 
following the final date of eligibility. Programme closure documentation would be submitted two 
years later and subject to subsequent agreement with the European Commission. 
With Brexit the final date for eligibility of expenditure of 31st December 2023 can be expected to 
be bought forward and the timeframe for programme and project implementation reduced. The 
HMT commitment may be more onerous than it initially appears, requiring coverage of project 
expenditure not only after but also prior to UK withdrawal. Revenue and expenditure in the EU 
budget must, in line with Treaty requirements, be in balance.10 This suggests that, following UK 
withdrawal, the cessation of UK contributions and consequent reduction of the EU’s revenue, the 
EU will be unable to pay against commitments from the year in question as well as those from 
preceding financial years. The UK could be obliged, as part of the Brexit negotiations, to either 
continue contributing to the EU budget beyond its departure or else accept a reduction in future 
payment appropriations. The latter could require HMT to reimburse (unclaimed) EU funds spent 
by the regions prior to Brexit. 
Additionally, the current regulatory framework provides that projects not ‘in use’ and ‘functioning’ 
at the point of the submission of closure documents are not eligible for reimbursement from the 
EU. In the case of projects not completed in advance of an, as yet undetermined, deadline, the UK 
Treasury must be prepared therefore to cover total costs, not just those incurred subsequent to UK 
withdrawal. Past/previous expenditure for project delivery would have to be removed from 
payment requests as ineligible for reimbursement from the EU and would seemingly need to be 
met under the HMT guarantee.11 Whilst ‘phasing’ projects across different programming periods 
or extending the deadline for ‘non-functioning projects’ is currently possible, a formal request 
from a departing Member State seems unlikely to be either requested or agreed.12  
                                                          
10 TFEU Article 310.1 
11 However, in line with Article 120.6 CPR national public funding cannot exceed more 80% of eligible public 
expenditure under an individual priority axis. 
12 These provisions do not apply across the full range of projects: productive investments, projects under 5 million 
euros and those that cannot be divided into clearly identifiable stages are excluded. 
A further complication arises from the fact that  
With Brexit looming, projects currently in the pipeline are likely to be reduced in size, scope and 
funding. Programme modification in favour of less risky revenue-based priorities and activities 
rather than priority axes dominated by large capital infrastructure projects is probable. Where 
financial instruments have been established or projects have received advances, EU expenditure 
may have to be clawed back in the case of inadequate payment or investment. Knock-on effects in 
terms of meeting requirements around thematic concentration on climate change and urban 
priorities and implementation milestones could be possible with resultant financial corrections. 
The risk of decommitment to the UK programmes is exacerbated further by the drop in sterling 
since the EU referendum and consequent increase in value of the (euro-denominated) programmes 
and hence national co-financing required. This raises the question as to what extent Brexit could 
be considered ‘force majeure’ under the ESIF regulations - an extraordinary event or circumstance 
that affects the implementation of programme priorities and could be invoked to avoid penalising 
a departing Member State. 
Requirements around verification and on the spot checks, document retention, revenue generation, 
use of resources paid back to financial instruments, durability and publicity further complicate 
matters by their required continuation beyond the closure of the programmes. This is even more 
complex in the case of infringements, irregularities, infractions and obligations to pursue 
recoveries of misappropriated EU funds. How could ‘sound financial management’ of EU funds 
be assured and controlled in a post-Brexit UK and by whom? 
The closure of EU funding programmes will all play out in a worrying institutional/organisational 
context where employees depart obsolete EU-related functions and staffing costs are no longer 
met through Technical Assistance (TA) priorities. Sections of the public sector that rely on EU 
funding to deliver large portfolios of activity and fund significant staff levels would need to be 
restructured. The impact on certain organisational structures such as Local Enterprise Partnerships, 
and on civil service staffing in the Welsh European Funding Office and the Special European 
Union Programme Body13 is likely to be significant. In a twist of fate, EU TA funds could 
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 The SEUPB manages cross-border European Union Structural Funds programmes in Northern Ireland, the Border 
Region of Ireland and parts of Western Scotland, see: http://www.seupb.eu/AboutUs/about-us.aspx 
potentially be made available to re-train public sector staff in a position of potential redundancy 
or for other organisational demands driven by Brexit.14 
Legal implications 
The ESIF regulations currently have direct application whilst the UK is a member of the EU; upon 
exit they will need to be transferred into UK law. The proposed ‘Great Repeal Act’ will repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 but freeze all EU law into UK law, maintaining it in force 
pending a later decision whether to amend or repeal them.  
Legal requirements under ESIF regulations suggest that, within the context of programme 
implementation, the UK will still be subject to all relevant aspects of EU law for a period of at 
least three years following withdrawal from the EU. ESIF programmes and projects must 
demonstrate compliance with ‘all applicable Union law’15 whilst ‘all the Commission's and 
Member States' rights and obligations remain valid in respect of assistance to operations’ 
throughout programme closure.16  
This raises interesting questions if the UK moves to a looser relationship with the EU such as that 
of a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) where not all EU Directives are applicable. 
Directives on nature protection (Habitats and Birds Directives), and some on water protection 
(bathing water, shellfish waters, surface fresh waters and fish waters Directives) could legally be 
removed by the UK Government or one of the Devolved Administrations yet compliance still be 
required within the ESIF framework.  
Likewise, should freedom of movement principles be revoked or EU migrants have their status 
significantly modified in the immediate post-Brexit period, ongoing ESIF projects may be 
hindered in their ability to ensure the ‘promotion of equality and non-discrimination’ in the 
operation of the funds.17 Unless EU nationals are able to participate equally with UK citizens in 
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 See for example the REACT programme in Wales: 
http://gov.wales/topics/educationandskills/skillsandtraining/reactemployers/?lang=en 
15 in line with Article 6 of Regulation 1303/2013 (Common Provisions Regulation - CPR) 
16 C(2013) 1573 
17 Article 7 CPR 
ESF-funded training courses, for example, a project could be deemed to be in breach of its 
contractual and legal obligations. 
Compliance with the principles of state aid and public procurement will also be complicated by a 
change in the UK’s status. Whilst continued access to the Single Market would mean these legal 
frameworks would remain in place, a more significant modification of the UK-EU relationship 
could result in different legal frameworks being applicable to projects depending on the source of 
their funding. ESI funded projects would arguably be required to follow EU legal provisions with 
projects funded from other sources subject to alternative legal frameworks such as WTO.  
The requirement for ‘effective application of Union law’ in the areas of environment, gender, state 
aid and public procurement compliance are now an ex-ante conditionality or pre-requisite of 
programming across ESIF. On that basis, it is questionable whether any modification could be 
made to these areas of law whilst the programmes were still operating without potentially risking 
financial and legal repercussions.  
These scenarios are rather simplistic in their assumption that the UK seamlessly moves from its 
current status as an EU member state to a new ‘status’ within an already-existing organisation or 
framework. Similarly, whilst it may seem more coherent to do so, there is no reason to assume that 
ESI funds will be subject to the same conditions under the withdrawal agreement. It is not 
necessarily the case that the relevant European Commission Directorate Generals or UK 
Government departments would wish to ensure consistent rules across them. Either side may 
instead prefer to respect certain fund specificities or implementation peculiarities. Likewise, 
financial guarantees from the UK government could be subject to political whims and events in a 
highly uncertain context. 
 
Policy Implications Post-Brexit 
UK participation in ESIF could be envisaged to continue only under European Territorial 
Cooperation (ETC) programmes. Here non-member states (and their regional/local governments) 
are able to participate in cross-border, inter-regional and transnational cooperation projects (for 
the most part) where they share a land or sea border with an EU member.18 Nevertheless, 
participation by non-members is reliant upon their financial contribution (ERDF equivalent 
funding) rather than receipt of EU funds. Other EU funding mechanisms for non-Member States 
bordering the Union such as the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
would not be relevant in the context of a withdrawing Member State. Alternative relationships 
with the EU that involve access to the Single Market such as the EEA require payments through 
‘financial mechanisms’ that mirror the functioning of Cohesion Policy. For the period 2014-2021 
the Norwegian contribution will be over 390 million euros per year yet the contributing states are 
ineligible for EU receipts.  
The loss of EU Cohesion Policy receipts is likely to result in a reconsideration of economic focus 
and strategy. The UK will need to establish and fund an alternative regional policy internal to the 
UK. Regional disparities in economic performance in the UK are now greater than those found in 
any other European country19 and the UK has little constitutional or policy commitment to the 
reduction of economic disparities or policy levers to respond to regional economic shocks. EU 
Cohesion Policy has seemingly provided the most coherent territorial approach in the 90 years of 
spatial policy within the UK and provides an important role in framing economic development.20 
The Welsh Secretary of State, Alun Cairns, was quick to suggest that the results of the referendum 
showed that those purported to benefit the most from European aid ‘did not want what was being 
offered to them’ and that to simply replace one source of funding with another i.e. using domestic 
funds to substitute EU funds, missed the point.21 Nevertheless, the haphazard dismantling of EU 
Cohesion Policy without an alternative policy and financial framework in place could prove 
ruinous for territories receiving larger financial rewards. Similarly, a failure to integrate any new 
national spatial policy with final investments taking place under the ESIF programmes and build 
on the legacy of 25 years of Cohesion Policy would prove short-sighted. 
Conclusion 
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 For example, the North Sea Region Programme and Northern Periphery Programme include Norway and Iceland; 
the North West Europe programme includes Switzerland. Non-member states participate under INTERREG, 
INTERACT, URBACT for example. http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2016/07/COHESION.pdf 
19
 http://www.regionalstudies.org/uploads/documents/SRTUKE_v16_PRINT.pdf 
20
 http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/news/20160620_Brexit_blog_post.pdf 
21 https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-07-13/debates/16071330000005/OralAnswersToQuestions 
Recent political events in the UK have caused significant vulnerability around the ESIF 
programmes and funding. It seems unlikely that the current round of funding will come to a natural 
end in the exiting Member State and financial, administrative and policy implications will be 
complex. On the basis of current regulatory requirements for programme implementation the UK 
will still be subject to all relevant aspects of EU law following withdrawal from the EU. How these 
rules could continue to operate in the context of a departing/ed Member State and whether regions 
who voted to leave the EU will still be spending their EU allocations and required to comply with 
EU law long after UK withdrawal is uncertain. However, a deeper question arises as to whether 
these longer-term requirements, should they exist under multiple regulatory or policy frameworks, 
would impact on the ability or speed of the UK to shake off the ‘burden’ of EU membership and 
regulation and move to new relationships and roles within the wider international framework. 
